The European Convention on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism by Hedigan, John
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 28, Issue 2 2004 Article 5
The European Convention on Human Rights
and Counter-Terrorism
John Hedigan∗
∗
Copyright c©2004 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The European Convention on Human Rights
and Counter-Terrorism
John Hedigan
Abstract
No part of the world has more experience with terrorism than Europe. The response of the
Council of Europe through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to its ex-
perience of terrorism may therefore assist in the ongoing battle against terrorism. The European
Convention reflects in many ways libertarian political and cultural values shared with the United
States. Its interpretation by the Court in the light of counter-terrorist measures by concerned gov-
ernments may therefore have some relevance in the United States.
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND COUNTER-TERRORISM
John Hedigan*
If the power of thought is universal among mankind, so likewise is the
possession of reason, making us rational creatures. It follows, there-
fore, that this reason speaks no less universally to us all with its "thou
shalt" or "thou shalt not. "So then there is a world-law; which in turn
means that we are all fellow-citizens and share a common citizenship,
and that the world is a single city.
Marcus Aurelius'
I. THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE
So wrote the Emperor toward the end of his nineteen-year
reign over the Roman empire at the pinnacle of its power and
prestige.2 Even then, in the second century A.D., the world to
him seemed as one. Today with global communications permit-
ting us to communicate almost instantly with practically every
part of the world and to know and see what happens in its most
far away places, our world surely remains no less small than the
Roman Emperor perceived it over 1,800 years ago.
In so many ways, this world of ours today is potentially the
best there has ever been. With all its disasters and famines, its
starving and excluded millions, its savage terrorism and brutal
repression, never before has mankind had such an ability to put
the world to right. Were we able to harness the technical and
commercial skills of the developed world to help lift the under-
*developed world up to a global standard of living, we could
surely solve so many of the current world problems that at times
seem likely to overwhelm so much that those of us in the devel-
oped world value and cherish. Even were we not able to solve
most, or even many of the world's problems, were we to try on a
global scale, we could certainly improve the world we bequeath
to those who come after us. Yet, little seems to progress in the
* Judge John Hedigan (Irish) has been on the European Court of Human Rights
since November 1, 1998.
1. MARcus AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS 65 (Maxwell Staniforth trans., 2002).
2. See North Park University, The Emperor Marcus Aurelius, available at http://
campus.northpark.edu/history/WebChron/Mediterranean/MAurelius.htnl (last vis-
itedJan. 22, 2005).
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task of addressing the problem of starvation, economic hardship,
and social unrest around the world. These surely breed much of
the fanaticism and hatred which nurtures terrorism. We seek,
apparently in vain, for some credible long-term plan conceived
on a global scale that might give some hope to those deprived
and to ourselves that the world genuinely embarks upon a clear
path to some measure of global equality, that it really is "a single
city."
Disbelief, doubt, even despair seem, however, to afflict us
when we perceive the savagery of terrorism tearing at the fabric
of civilization. Our hope for the future flounders as we see the
response to terror eat away at the very pillars of democracy and
the rule of law. We fear the terrorists, but we also fear the dam-
age that desperate government efforts to defend their citizens
against attack may cause. We fear the damage that may result to
the human rights protective system from the efforts of govern-
ments to defend their people. We fear that ill-considered,
counter-terrorism measures taken in the agony of the moment
may undo the achievements of much effort over a very long
time. At the same time we see, with growing apprehension, ef-
forts by some governments to justify long-standing human rights
violations by reference to new terrorist threats.
While we need to respond to immediate danger with imme-
diate action, we also need to address with some long-term think-
ing and planning what we can do to tackle the real causes of
terrorism. Yet, all too often, political decisions remain based
upon short-term considerations. In security matters, when faced
with immediate threats, ad hoc decisions which people assume do
not create a precedent for the future seem acceptable. Yet when
it comes to questions so basic to our civilization and to our sense
of ourselves as secret imprisonment, torture or inhuman treat-
ment, unreviewable forms of detention or the right to a fair trial
among other things, short-term solutions may cause long-term
damage to standards painfully achieved over many years. Yet all
too often, as our experience shows, the public response to acts of
terror call for harsh and repressive measures that frequently do
pressure the legal framework designed to protect against abusive
treatment of prisoners. We can safely assume that this chorus
includes many who always support repressive authoritarianism.
Many who value our libertarian values, however, become
tempted in this direction. It takes a very strong and wise body
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politic to keep its head in such circumstances. Against the call
for so-called "tough measures," few political leaders can find the
strength and wisdom or indeed the support to fight terrorism
while preserving the established human rights protective system.
Repressive sirens will always call for "new" harsh measures to
meet these "new" challenges from terrorism and few leaders
have the toughness to "hold the fort" in such circumstances.
Yet terrorism is not a new phenomenon.' Today, the horror
of the World Trade Center,4 Bali,5 the Madrid bombing,6 and
more recently, the school at Beslan transfix us.' Terrorism how-
ever, has lived for a very long time.' Moreover, atrocities from
the biblical slaughter of the innocents to the Nazi transportation
of thousands of Jewish children to their deaths in concentration
camps, do not spare the young.9 The last half-century has seen
Europe assailed by terrorism in almost all the forms we see to-
day, albeit now on a more global scale.
II. RECENT EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE OF TERRORISM
In the course of the last half-century, Europe has faced ter-
rorist attacks in many countries; Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom to name some.1 °
In a sense, the entire continent suffered from the State-spon-
sored terrorism of Nazism, Fascism, and Stalinism, during the
3. See Mark Burgess, A Brief History of Terrorism, available at http://www.cdi.org/
friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentlD=1 502 (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
4. See Investigators Chased Leads as the US. Weighed Military Retaliation, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 13, 2001, at Al.
5. See Terror in Bali, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002, at A16.
6. See Matthew Kaminski, Terror in Madrid, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2004, at A14.
7. See George Melloan, Beslan's Message: Terrorists Don't Have Souls, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 7, 2004, at A21.
8. See Burgess, supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Children and the Holocaust, available at http://www.mtsu.edu/-baus-
tin/children.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
10. See, e.g., John Tabliabue, 2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1986, § 1, at 1; William E. Schmidt, Violence Escalates in Northern Ire-
land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, § 1, at 3; Alan Cowell, More Bombings: Italy's Religious
Heritage Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, § 4, at 2; Howell Raines, 3 British Service-
men Are Killed in IRA. Attacks in Netherlands, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1988, at Al; Renwick
McLean, Madrid Car Bomb Wounds 40, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A12; William E.
Schmidt, 4 Hurt as 2 IRA Bombs Go Off On Busy London Shopping Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 1992, A5.
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1930s and 1940s. 11 One may state, therefore, that no part of the
world has more experience with terrorism than Europe. Cer-
tainly, no Nation is alone as a victim of terror.
The Member States of the Council of Europe have, as a
body, a very broad range of experience in battling terrorism.
Since the Second World War, this experience has evolved at the
same time as the development of the European Convention on
Human Rights ("European Convention") and its protective sys-
tem. 2 It is of interest to see how this reflected in the European
Convention itself in the first place and the case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights ("Court of Human Rights") in the
second. The message to derive from this story is that not only
can the law of human rights fight terrorism, but it has. To ex-
amine how, one needs to go back to the beginning.
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONVENTION SYSTEM
Both the European experience of fascism and the Second
World War seem to have inspired the European Convention sys-
tem of collective State responsibility.1 3 The abuse of human
rights that occurred during this period was of such a gross na-
ture that it was clear that leaving individual rights to the mercy
of individual States was a recipe for disaster. The South African
experience towards the end of the 1940s seems to have con-
firmed this view." As that country ignored world opinion and
introduced the apartheid system, the world community stood by
powerless to act.1" Something had to be done.
In answer to this and in the light of their recent experience,
a number of the countries of Europe formed the view that the
best way forward comprised a form of collective State responsi-
11. See Marijan Pavcnik & Louis E. Wolcher, A Dialogue on Legal Theory Between a
European Legal Philosopher and His American Friend, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 335, 381 (2000).
12. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, signed at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, effective Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S 222, as
amended by Protocol No. 11, ETS No. 155, entered into force Nov. 1, 1998, reprinted in
EUROPEAN UNION LAw: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 255 (George A. Bermann et al. eds.,
2002) [hereinafter European Convention].
13. See Victor Ferreres Comella, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review
in a Special Court: Some Thoughts on Judicial Activism, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1711-12
(2004).
14. See generallyJohan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid South
Afica, 40 EMORY L.J. 745 (1991).
15. See id.
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bility.' 6 They decided to bind themselves by agreement to se-
cure to their people certain minimum rights. 17 Inspired by their
own heritage of libertarian values, they set about drafting a code
that would both establish those rights formally on an interna-
tional level and create a judicial structure whereby they could
insure the identification and security of those rights.1 8 They
would do this on the basis of collective responsibility for each
others' obligations in this regard.19
During 1949 and 1950, European Nations drafted the Euro-
pean Convention.2 ° These Nations adopted and opened the Eu-
ropean Convention for signature on November 4, 1950, and it
came into force on September 3, 1953, upon ratification by eight
of the fourteen signatory States.2 1 At the time of this writing, this
has increased to forty-six States.2 The original eight States were
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Lux-
embourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 23 Few
could have foreseen then what this relatively small beginning
would grow to over the following fifty years. During that time,
the European Convention has inspired similar conventions in
the Americas,2 4 in Africa,2 5 and elsewhere.2 6 Many other such
conventions and bills of rights within the constitutions of a num-
ber of States have the European Convention as their model. 27
16. See European Convention, supra note 12, pmbl.; see also 2 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TowARD WORLD PEACE 30 (1980); Daniel
B. Pickard, Security Council Resolution 808: A Step Toward a Permanent International Court
for the Prosecution of International Crimes and Human Rights Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 435, 456 (1995).
17. See Pickard, supra note 16, at 456.
18. See FERENCZ, supra note 16, at 30; see also Pickard, supra note 16, at 456-57.
19. See Pickard, supra note 16, at 456-57.
20. See FERENCZ, supra note 16, at 30; see also Pickard, supra note 16, at 456.
21. See MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS
3 (1995).
22. See Council of Europe, Member States of The Council of Europe, available at http://
conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG
(last visited Feb. 23, 2005) (noting that there are 46 signatories but only 45 States rati-
fied the convention).
23. SeeJANIS ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.
24. See American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, OEA/Ser. L.V./
11.82, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
25. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981).
26. See, e.g., Council of the League of Arab States, The Arab Charter on Human
Rights, Sept. 15, 1995, reprinted in 18 Hum. RTs. LJ. 151 (1997).
27. See, e.g., Yash Ghai, Universal Rights and Cultural Pluralism: Universalism and Rela-
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IV. THE COURT COMMISSION AND THE
COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
Although the European Convention came into force in
1953, 1959 saw the structure for overseeing the implementation
completed. It consisted of the Commission of Human Rights,
the Court of Human Rights, and the Committee of Ministers
(Foreign) of the Council of Europe. 28
Persons, groups, or States initially made complaints at the
Commission of Human Rights. 29 The Commission decided on
the admissibility of complaints. 3° It could hear submissions from
the parties, orally or written.31 If it found a complaint admissi-
ble, it attempted to secure a friendly settlement of the matter
between the parties.32 If the Commission could not achieve
friendly settlement, then the Commission drew up a report on
the facts of the case and stated its opinion as to whether the facts
found disclosed a breach by the State concerned of its obliga-
tions under the European Convention.33 The Commission
made a report, but did not make binding decisions on the inter-
pretation and application of the European Convention.34 The
Commission might then refer the case either to the Court or in
certain circumstances to the Committee of Ministers.35
Secondly, the Court of Human Rights delivered judgments
binding in international law on the interpretation and applica-
tivsm: Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CAR ozo L. REv.
1095, 1029-30 (2000) (reporting that the Fiji Constitution of 1970 contained a Bill of
Rights based on the European Convention); Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitu-
tional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 511, 531 (1991)
(noting that the Czech Bill of Rights incorporates principles of the European Conven-
tion); Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judi-
cial Dominance Wen Interpreting Rights?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1963, 1965 (2004) (explaining
that the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act incorporates the European Convention).
28. SeeJonathan L. Black-Branch, Observing and Enforcing Human Rights Under the
Council of Europe: The Creation of a Permanent European Court of Human Rights, 3 BuFF. J.
INT'L L. 1, 7 (1996).
29. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 34; see also Black-Branch, supra
note 28, at 19.
30. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 29; see also Black-Branch, supra
note 28, at 19.
31. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 31.
32. See id. arts. 38-39.
33. See id. art. 41.
34. See id.
35. See id. art. 46.
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tion of the European Convention.3 6 The Court could also award
damages or 'just satisfaction" as referred to in Article 41 of the
Convention. Its function was to determine if States had
breached the European Convention.38 If they had, the Court's
judgment did not strike down the act which gave rise to the
breach by making it unlawful or unconstitutional. It declared
the State to be in breach of the Convention.4 ° The State con-
cerned was under an obligation to comply with the judgment
and the Committee of Ministers supervised the execution of the
judgment.4" In many cases, this required Contracting States to
change their laws or procedures to bring them into line with the
European Convention.42
Thirdly, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Eu-
rope could decide a Contracting State had breached the Euro-
pean Convention under Article 32 in a case never referred to the
Court.4 3 As in the case of a judgment of the Court, the Commit-
tee of Ministers could award just satisfaction.44 Its decisions were
final and obliged the State concerned to comply with the deci-
sion.45
This former three-headed system operated for almost forty
years.46 The structure was, at least in the case of the Court and
Commission, part-time.47 Although at the beginning both were
under-utilized,48 by its end in 1998, the Court sat for approxi-
mately one week each month and the Commission by its end in
1999 for approximately two weeks in every month. In 1975, 335
applications were registered with the Commission.49 In 1998,
36. See id. art. 46.
37. See id. art. 41.
38. See id. art. 46.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. art. 54.
42. See id. art. 53.
43. See id. art. 32.
44. See id. art. 46.
45. See id.
46. See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, European Court of Human
Rights, available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ECHR.htrnl (last visited Jan. 22,
2005).
47. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 42
48. See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, supra note 46.
49. See 472 DAIL DEB. col. 816 (Dec. 4, 1996) (Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Motion).
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5,979 were registered.50
The Court's workload also reflected this development.51 In
its early years, the Court had very few cases with which to deal.12
A number of countries delayed some time before they accepted
the right of individuals to seek redress under the European Con-
vention5 3 and this also inhibited the growth of the system's activ-
ity. Gradually, however, that activity grew. In its first thirty years,
the Court delivered thirty-six judgments. 4 By 1998 (when it
came to an end), it had delivered 837 judgments.5 5 By its end,
the Court had reached a position of preeminence in the protec-
tion of human rights in Europe no one could have imagined
when the European Convention was signed in 1950.56
V. THE CURRENT POST-1998 STRUCTURE
Overhauling the system became necessary due to the mas-
sive increase in its case load,57 and this was achieved in 1998." 8
The former Court and the Commission were abolished and their
joint functions given to a new, full-time, permanent Court of
Human Rights. 59 This Court, like its predecessor, has one judge
from each member country.60 There are currently forty-six
member countries. 61 Judges are elected to a six-year term by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.6 2 This body
consists of Parliamentarians from each of the Parliaments of the
Council of Europe.6 3 The Parliamentary Assembly elects one
judge from each country from a list of three proposed by its gov-
50. See Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Human
Rights: Historical Background, Organisation and Procedure, available at http://www.echr.
coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See European Convention, Dates of Entry Into Force, available at http://www.echr.
coe.int/Eng/EDocs/DatesOfRatifications.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
54. See, e.g., JANIS ET AL., supra note 21, at 28.
55. See Project on International Courts and Tribunals, supra note 46.
56. See generally Leo F. Zwaak & Therese Cachia, The European Court of Human
Rights: A Success Story?, 11(3) HUM. RTs. BRIEF 32 (2004).
57. See id. at 33.
58. See id.
59. See Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 50.
60. See European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 38.
61. See Dates of Entry Into Force, supra note 53.
62. See Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 50.
63. See id.
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ernment.64 It is proposed to change this to a single non-renewa-
ble term of nine years."
The Court sits in Committees of three judges6 6 which may,
acting unanimously, strike out clearly inadmissible cases, in four
Chambers of seven judges, or in two Grand Chambers of seven-
teen judges.67
Cases come to the Court as applications from individuals.6"
Other than a Committee striking an application as above, an ap-
plication will be referred to a Chamber of seven which may de-
cide to communicate it to the government. 69 Following submis-
sions from the government and replies thereto by the applicant,
the Chamber decides on admissibility with sometimes a provi-
sional vote on the merits of the case, i.e., as to whether a State
has committed a violation. 70 There follows an attempt to settle
the case on a friendly basis.71 If not settled thus, the Chamber
proceeds to a decision on the merits as to whether a State has
violated the European Convention.72
The decision thus reached does not become final until
three months later,73 unless during this time the parties agree
not to refer the case to the Grand Chamber." If either of the
parties do refer it, a panel of the Grand Chamber decides
whether it will accept the case for referral. 75 The Grand Cham-
ber accepts very few cases for referral. If it does accept a case,
64. European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 38.
65. See Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Presi-
dent Calls for Speedy Ratification of New Protocol (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2005/jan/annualpressconferencejanuary%202005.htm
("Protocol No. 14, which amends the Convention system, is intended to guarantee the
Court's long-term effectiveness by optimising the screening and processing of applica-
tions. Opened for signature on 13 May 2004, it has so far been signed by 32 countries
and ratified by six of those. It will enter into force once ratified by all the States party to
the Convention.").
66. See Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 50.
67. See id.
68. See European Court of Human Rights, Application, available at http://www.echr.
coe.int/Application%20forms/FormulaireBILINGUE.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2004);
see also Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 50.
69. See Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 50, 3.
70. See id. (noting that the complaints were first the subject of a preliminary exami-
nation by the Commission, which determined their admissibility).
71. See id
72. See id.
73. See id. 28.
74. See id. 27.
75. See id.
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then the Chamber decision is set aside and the Grand Chamber
decides on the case. The Chamber level hears few cases by way
of public oral hearings. At the Grand Chamber level, all cases
dealt with to date have received a public oral hearing.
VI. THE REACH OF THE CONVENTION TODAY
From its small beginnings, the European Convention's
reach has spread three quarters of the way around the globe.
Today the Court's jurisdiction stretches from Iceland to the Pa-
cific coast of the Russian Federation.76 Forty-six States encom-
passing over 800 million Europeans now have bound themselves
by this more than half-century old Charter.77 Persons within the
jurisdiction of each of them now have the right of individual pe-
tition directly to the Court of Human Rights once they have ex-
hausted their domestic remedies. Each of the countries, in the
words of the European Convention Article 1, have undertaken to
"secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in Section 1 of this Convention."7 "
They also may have responsibility, in certain circumstances,
with respect to acts that occur outside their territorial jurisdic-
tion.79 The most recent example of this occurred when the Eu-
ropean Court found Russia responsible for the acts of its agents
in the Moldovan breakaway province of Transdniestria.8 0 The
military, political, and economic support of the separatist regime
by the Russian Federation was such that the Court held it re-
sponsible for violations of human rights although committed in
the breakaway province which was beyond Russian territory.8 "
The Court based its opinion on the European Convention
Paragraphs 310 through 319. In the Court's judgment, while ju-
risdiction remains a necessary condition for the State's responsi-
76. See European Court of Human Rights, Composition of the Court, available at
http://echr.coe.int/BilingualDocuments/LISTEDEPRESEANCE.htm (last visited Dec.
24, 2004).
77. See id.
78. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby,
May 11, 1994, Eur. T.S. No. 155, 33 I.L.M. 960, art. 1 (1994).
79. See Ilascu v. Moldova, App. No. 48787/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2004) (not yet
reported), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=6&portal=
hbkm&action=html&highlight=ilascu&sessionid=1 319768&skin=hudoc-en.
80. See id. 382.
81. See id. 383-85.
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bility, circumstances may occur where that jurisdiction is not
necessarily restricted to the national territory of the high con-
tracting party.82 Acts of the States performed outside their terri-
tory or producing effects there may amount to the exercise by
them of their jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1.83 A
State's responsibility may engage where, by means of military ac-
tion, it in effect exercises control over an area beyond its terri-
tory.84 By virtue of that control, and pursuant to Article 1, they
are obliged to secure to those within their area of control, the
rights guaranteed by the European Convention.8 5 This obliga-
tion arises where it exercises control through its armed forces
directly or through a subordinate local administration.86
It is not necessary to determine whether a Contracting Party
actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions
of the authorities in the area situated outside its national terri-
tory since overall control alone of the area may engage the re-
sponsibility of the Contracting Party concerned.87 Responsibility
extends not just to the acts of soldiers or officials, but also to acts
of the local administration which survives by virtue of its military
and other support. 88 Moreover, the acquiescence or connivance
of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of private
individuals within its jurisdiction may engage the State's respon-
sibility under the Convention where they act ultra vires or con-
trary to instructions8 9 The European Convention does, how-
ever, have limits."°
The Court has held that the European Convention operates
in a regional context notably in the legal space of the Con-
tracting States.9" It is not designed to apply throughout the
world even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States. 2
82. See id. 330.
83. See id. (explaining that such jurisdiction is still subject to Article I constraints);
see also id. 1 383-85.
84. See id. 330, 383-85.
85. See id. 387-94.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. 319.
90. See id. 312 (holding that from the standpoint of public international law, the
words "within their jurisdiction" in Article 1 of the Convention must be understood to
mean that a State's jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial).
91. See id.
92. See id.
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The Court recognized to date such extraterritorial jurisdiction
only in respect of territory which the European Convention
would normally cover, as in the cases of Cyprus and Transdnies-
tria, but not in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.93
VII. COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE COURT'S RESPONSE:
THE GENERAL APPROACH
As noted above, no part of the world has more experience
with terrorism than Europe. The response of the Council of Eu-
rope through the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights to its experience of terrorism may therefore assist
in the ongoing battle against terrorism.94 The European Con-
vention reflects in many ways libertarian political and cultural
values shared with the United States. Its interpretation by the
Court in the light of counter-terrorist measures by concerned
governments may therefore have some relevance in the United
States.95
Terrorism, in its essence, is an attempt to undermine de-
mocracy and the rule of law by acts so outrageous that demo-
cratic society is driven from the moderate center from where it
normally governs itself to the extreme right or left from where it
may develop authoritarian measures to defend itself.9 6 Terror-
ism seeks to impose upon the majority the views of a minority,
because it stops at nothing in pursuit of its aims.97 Terrorists
aim, presumably, to either terrorize the majority into meeting
the demand of the fanatical few or drive it to abandon moderate
democracy for authoritarianism in the hope of thereby collaps-
93. Compare Cyprus v. Turkey, [2002] 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30, with Bankovic & Others
v. Belgium & 16 Other Contracting States, Application No. 52207/99, 11 B.H.R.C. 435
(Grand Chamber, Dec. 12, 2001).
94. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Looking Ahead: Strategic Priorities and Challenges for the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469,
488-89 (2004) (noting that the Council of Europe has issued Recommendation 1550 for
combating terrorism).
95. See Jeremie J. Wattellier, Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from
Europe, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 397 (2004) (noting that European legal
responses to its terrorist attacks can be used to ascertain the prudence of American
legal responses to terrorism).
96. See Luzius Wildhaber, Balancing Necessity and Human Rights in Reponse to Terror-
ism, available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Ministerial-Conferences/2002-ju-
dicial/Panel3_LuziusWildhaber.asp#TopOfPage (last visited Dec. 31, 2004).
97. See id.
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ing democratic society.9 8 In either event, terrorism attacks the
pillars of democracy and the rule of law upon which the human
rights structure rests.9 9 Democratic Nations must defend against
this assault, and human rights law must accommodate that
need. 00 The President of the European Court of Human
Rights, Judge Luzius Wildhaber, °1 speaking at the Tenth An-
nual International Judicial Conference in Strasbourg, May 22-24,
2002, on balancing necessity and human rights in response to
terrorism observed:
the European Convention should not be applied in such a
way as to prevent States from taking reasonable and propor-
tionate action to defend democracy and the rule of law.
Moreover, as the European Court of Human Rights has held,
Convention States have a duty under Article 2 of the Conven-
tion to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those
within their jurisdiction, 0 2
If democratic States are not going to give terrorism its vic-
tory by driving them to extreme counter-measures, then those
societies must always take care to ensure that while their re-
sponse to terrorism remains a strong and effective one, it is also
a careful and proportionate one. 10 3 Wendell Phillips said that
"the price of liberty is eternal vigilance."10 4 That vigilance must
be not just against the enemy without, but also against the insidi-
ous attempt which lies at the heart of terrorism to lead demo-
cratic society to subvert itself from within.0 5 The need for this
careful balance between a strong and effective response to ter-
rorism on the one hand and preserving our democratic human
rights on the other has motivated the jurisprudence of the Court
over the near half century of its existence where it has addressed
the problems raised by terrorism.
The Court has frequently been called upon since its very
first case of Lawless v. Ireland in 1959 to deal with complaints
arising from counter-terrorist measures taken by Contracting
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Wendell Phillips, Speech Before the Massachusetts Antislavery Society (1852), in THE
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (Bergen Evans ed., 1968).
105. See Wildhaber, supra note 96.
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States.1"6 Following are some examples of how the Court has
applied some of those principles since that time. Referring to
some European Convention Articles that have arisen in these
cases will conveniently achieve this.
A. Article 1 - Obligation to Respect Human Rights
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within
theirjurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I
of this Convention.
10 7
This Article requires that the High Contracting Parties se-
cure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in the European Convention. l0 8 The Court has
recognized that there may be no time when those rights are
more under threat, or when they are more needed, than when
the State is faced with terrorist attack.1"9 Therefore, such times
as these require the closest and most careful supervision by the
Court.1 10 Yet the Court has found that interference with rights
may be necessary and acceptable subject to the Court's supervi-
sion.1" Moreover, derogation from certain articles of the Euro-
pean Convention may be permissible subject to the Court's su-
pervisory jurisdiction.1 12 Interference or derogation must be jus-
tified and is under the close supervision of the Court.113 The
Court may permit a margin of tolerance or a margin of apprecia-
tion, as known in the jurisprudence of the Court, in relation to
106. Lawless v. Ireland, [1960] 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1.
107. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 1.
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., Ilhan v. Turkey, [2002] 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (reporting that the
plaintiff was injured in a situation where he was thought to be a dangerous, escaping
terrorist).
110. See id. (laying down the requirement of an official investigation into facts sur-
rounding the deaths instituted by officials without waiting for an individual complaint).
111. See Hatton & Others v. United Kingdom, [2003] 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (rec-
ognizing that States could interfere with Convention Rights, although they had to mini-
mize that interference as far as possible).
112. Seelrelandv. United Kingdom, [1980] 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 207 (noting that
States do not enjoy unlimited power).
113. See id. (noting that while the State has a wide margin of appreciation to deter-
mine whether the life of the Nation is threatened by a public emergency and, if so, how
far it might go in attempting the overcome it, the Court is empowered to rule on
whether the State has gone beyond the "extent strictly required by the exigencies" of
the crisis in derogating from the Convention).
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such interference or derogation.114 The 1978 case of Klass v.
Germany, displays an early but still classical (and topical) exposi-
tion of this.115 Dealing with powers of secret surveillance of its
citizens, the Court observed at Paragraph 42 that "[p]owers of
secret surveillance of citizens characterising as they do the police
[S] tate, are tolerable under [the European Convention] only in-
sofar as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institu-
tions. '  Paragraph 48 further states:
Democratic societies nowadays find themselves threatened by
highly sophisticated forms of espionage and by terrorism,
with the result that the State must be able, in order effectively
to counter such threats, to undertake the secret surveillance
of subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction. The
Court has therefore to accept that the existence of some legis-
lation granting powers of secret surveillance over the mail,
post and telecommunications is, under exceptional condi-
tions, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of na-
tional security and/or for the prevention of disorder or
crime.'
1 7
Further at Paragraph 49, the Court observed:
Nevertheless the Court stresses that this does not mean that
the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discretion to sub-
ject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance.
The Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of
undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of
defending it, affirms that a Contracting State may not in the
name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism adopt
whatever measures they deem appropriate. 118
So, while a margin of appreciation remains available to States,
ultimately the Court determines how far a State may go in com-
bating terrorism and thereby to supervise the manner in which
they do so." 9
114. See Hatton, [2003] 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 631 (noting that the State enjoyed a
certain margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compli-
ance with the Convention).
115. [1978] 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4, [1979-1980] 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214.
116. See id. at 231, 42.
117. See id. at 232, 48.
118. See id. at 232, 49.
119. See id. (stating that the Court must be satisfied that, whatever system of surveil-
lance is adopted, there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse).
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B. Article 2 - Right to Life
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the exe-
cution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the use
of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the es-
cape of a person lawfully detained;
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a
riot or insurrection.
1 20
This Article protects the right to life. Heretofore, this has been
taken to refer to "lives in being. "121 The Article sets out excep-
tions where deprivation of life results from the use of force
which is no more than absolutely necessary, and any one of the
three exceptions might well be involved in the context of terror-
ist violence.1 2 2
In McCann v. the United Kingdom, the Court dealt with the
case where a security forces operation killed a number of terror-
ist suspects. 12' The United Kingdom alleged that the suspects
were involved in planting a bomb in Gibraltar which is, among
other things, a British military base. 124 A shootout killed the de-
ceased.1 25 The operation by the authorities was planned in such
a way that it seemed inevitable that any force used would be le-
thal. 126 The suspects were neither armed nor was there in fact a
bomb in Gibraltar which they could have detonated.1 27 It was
however, apparently their plan.12 ' The authorities planned the
operation in such a way as to ensure that authorities could
gather evidence for a later trial. The Court found that this aim
could not justify the unnecessary risk of death to either the vic-
120. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 2.
121. See id.
122. See McCann & Others v. United Kingdom, [1996] 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97.
123. See id. at 123, 103.
124. See id. at 118, 78.
125. See id. at 114-19, 59-81.
126. See id. at 112-13, 48-53.
127. See id. at 121, 93.
128. See id. at 122, 98-100.
408 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:392
tims or to innocent parties. 129 It seems clear that part of the
rationale for this decision was the difficulty of requiring soldiers
in a shootout situation to make snap decisions as to what is or is
not necessary. At Paragraph 213, the Court summarized its deci-
sion:
In sum, having regard to the decision not to prevent the sus-
pects from travelling into Gibraltar, to the failure of the au-
thorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that
their intelligence assessments might, in some respect at least,
be erroneous and to the automatic recourse to lethal force
when the soldiers opened fire, the Court is not persuaded
that the killing of the three terrorists, constituted the use of
force which was no more than absolutely necessary in defence
of persons from unlawful violence within the meaning of Arti-
cle 2(2) (a) of the Convention.' 30
It seems clear that the Court based its finding in McCann
upon a finding of inadequate planning by the authorities. 3 ' The
requirement by the Court seems to put upon the State the bur-
den of arranging matters so that a minimum risk to life occurs in
any anti-terrorist activities that it carries out.3 2 The problems
raised in relation to evidence in this kind of situation are obvi-
ously quite considerable. 3 ' The Court requires that anti-terror-
ist activities by the State must ensure minimum risk to life.'
In a powerful dissenting judgement by nine of the judges of
the Court (led by the then President of the Court), the minority
considered that the government did not lack appropriate care in
the control and organization of the arrest operation, and that
the use of lethal force, however regrettable, did not exceed such
as was "absolutely necessary." The dissenters did, however, em-
phasize the utmost seriousness of the obligation on the State to
protect the right to life. The difficulties of everyone involved in
such extraordinary circumstances are very clearly demonstrated
by this division in the Court. The unanimous Court found that a
129. See id. at 173, 230.
130. Id. at 176-77, 213.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Civil Evidence Act, 1968, 64(11) (Eng.) (noting that the government has
to get evidence before the government can convict someone).
134. See Oneryildiz v. Turkey, [2004] 39 Eur. H.R. Rep 12 (referring to a
State's duty to take all necessary measures to prevent lives in being from being uneces-
sarily exposed to danger and, ultimately, from being lost).
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heavy burden of responsibility lay on the State in conducting
anti-terrorist operations to ensure that only such lethal force as
was absolutely necessary was in fact used.
Under Article 2, the Court has also established the need for
proper investigation into unexplained or suspicious deaths. 135
The significance of this in counter-terrorist operations must be
crucial since frequently the authorities will have in their custody
those who are regarded as their deadly enemies and as being
prepared themselves to stop at nothing.1 36 Unexplained deaths
in such custody situations must therefore always give rise to the
gravest of suspicions.1 3 7 In such circumstances, the Court has
established the following obligations:
a) there must be an official investigation into the facts sur-
rounding the deaths instituted by officials without wait-
ing for an individual complaint; 138
b) the form of the investigation may vary with the circum-
stances but must be characterised by the independence
of the investigators who should be independent of those
who are the subject of the investigation;3 9
c) the investigator should have the power to examine wit-
nesses and to have carried out for him effective autopsies
and must carry out his inquiry in good time; 4 0
d) the investigation must be capable of reaching a definitive
conclusion about whether the force used was lawful;14 1
e) even if the investigation is not public, interested parties
should have the opportunity to participate and be in-
formed of the result of the inquiry; 4 2
f) if the inquiry concludes that death was the result of the
use of unlawful force its report must be considered by the
prosecution authorities and where relevant the relatives
of the victim given the reasons why a prosecution is not
going ahead.
143
135. See Ilhan v. Turkey, [2002] 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36.
136. See id. 880. In the facts of that case, the plaintiff was put into custody. See id.
137. See id. 913 (noting that investigations into such deaths have frequently been
superficial and inadequate).
138. See id. 908.
139. Gulec v. Turkey, [1999] 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121.
140. Kaya v. Turkey, [1998] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1.
141. See id. 7 23, 27 (noting that the contents of the autopsy report were rather
imprecise and that the Court considers that to have been one of the major deficiencies
in the investigation).
142. Ogur v. Turkey, [2001] 31 Eur. H.R, Rep. 40.
143. See id.
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Through the above requirements, the Court attempts to en-
sure that in circumstances where it remains difficult for appli-
cants to obtain any information as to what has occurred, 144 the
authorities who have the ability to do so are required to provide
proper, effective, thorough investigation of unexplained
deaths.145
C. Article 3 - Prohibition of Torture
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment. 1
46
The prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment is absolute. No derogation is permissi-
ble in respect of Article 3. The State remains responsible for the
safety and well-being of those in its custody no matter what the
circumstances.
Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of
democratic society. The Court is well aware of the immense
difficulty faced by States in modem times in protecting their
communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these
circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
irrespective of the victims' conduct. 14
7
The Article deals with torture as one head and with inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment as another. 14 8 How-
ever, the countries concerned must find a violation under either
head as shameful and humiliating. The U.N. General Assembly
in 1975 declared that "[t]orture constitutes an aggravated and
deliberate form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment."'49 Amnesty International in its worldwide cam-
paign against torture once had as its motto: "Torture - as un-
thinkable as slavery."
150
144. See, e.g., Kaya, [1999] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 7 (noting that the body of the
deceased was only discovered some months after the incident that caused his death).
145. See id. 23-24 (listing things that were wrong the authorities' investigation
and that needed to be improved.).
146. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
147. Chahal v. United Kingdom, [1997] 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413.
148. See Selmouni v. France, [1999] 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403, 96.
149. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 1.
150. See, e.g., Amnesty for the Defense, TIME, July 9, 1973, available at http://www.time.
com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,907502,00.html#anchofie ("The report is an-
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The Court has dealt all too frequently with claims under Ar-
ticle 3.151 It has been forced on occasion to make distinctions
between what constitutes torture and what constitutes inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.152 While emphasizing
that the finding of a violation under either provision of Article 3
is a very serious matter, the Court has nonetheless reserved the
description of "torture" for the most serious and deliberate in-
stances. 153 The Court has stated that:
It was the intention that the Convention with its distinction
between torture and inhuman treatment should by the first of
these terms attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman
treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering.' 54
In that case, the British authorities in Northern Ireland had
subjected persons in their custody to forms of interrogation in-
cluding the five techniques in question, including covering their
heads with hoods (sensory deprivation), obliging them to stand
for long periods against a wall with their limbs outstretched, sub-
jecting them to intense noise, depriving them of sleep and feed-
ing them on a diet of bread and water.'55
The Commission found these techniques amounted to tor-
ture in violation of Article 3.156 In a judgment still regarded to-
day with considerable reservation, the Court characterised them
as "inhuman and degrading treatment." 1 57 The Court still how-
ever found a violation of Article 3.V 8
In Aksoy v. Turkey, the Court for the first time found a State
guilty of torture.159 Authorities stripped the applicant naked
and with his arms tied behind his back, suspended him by his
arms. 16 ° In the Court's view, authorities deliberately inflicted
other step in [Amnesty International] 's newly launched campaign to 'raise a public
outcry throughout the world until torture becomes as unthinkable as slavery.'").
151. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, [1980] 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25; Selmouni,
[1999] 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403.
152. See, e.g., Selmouni, [1999] 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403, 71 100-01, 105; Aksoy v. Tur-
key, [1997] 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 1 63; Ireland, [1980] 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 1 164-65.
153. See, e.g., Selmouni, [1999] 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403, 1 105-06; Aksoy, [1997] 23
Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 1 64; Ireland, [1980] 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 1 167.
154. Ireland, [1980] 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 1 167.
155. See id. 1 96.
156. See id. 167.
157. See id. 164-67.
158. See id. 1 167.
159. [1997] 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553.
160. See id. 1 64.
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this and of so serious and cruel a nature that the Court could
only describe it as torture. 16 1
The observer may wonder at the distinction in the Court's
characterisation of torture in these two cases. It remains worthy
of notice however that, as observed above, any finding of a viola-
tion of Article 3 for whatever reason must always shockingly in-
dict the relevant leadership.
Evolving standards in relation to such behavior may explain
the distinction made in the two above cases.' 6 2 The Court in
Selmouni v. France found that the exposure of the applicant, a
prisoner suspected of drug smuggling, to severe beatings, to run-
ning the gauntlet of police officers trying to trip him up, being
urinated upon, threatened with a blow lamp and threats of sex-
ual assault amounted to torture. 16' The Court considered that
certain acts which in the past might have been classified as "in-
human or degrading treatment" as opposed to "torture" could
be classified differently in the future.'6 4 It took the view that the
increasingly high standard being required in the area of the pro-
tection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspond-
ingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing
breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies. 65
The pressure to ill treat or torture persons within their cus-
tody is, of course, greater the greater the perceived threat to so-
ciety.' 6 6 The usual question posed remains the "ticking bomb"
situation where the prisoner "definitely" knows the location of a
bomb in the city. One must wonder at how "definite" the knowl-
edge must be before torture is supposedly justified. 67 Where a
suspect "surely must know" is a point of departure easily reached
- then where he "probably knows," then where he "might possi-
bly know."'' 68
In truth, once the government crosses the line, everything
rapidly becomes not only permissible, but probably obligatory. 69
161. See id.
162. Selmouni v. France, [1999] 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403.
163. See id. 103-06.
164. See id. 101.
165. See id.
166. See H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Israel,
(53(4) P.D. 817.
167. See id. 37.
168. See id.
169. See id.
2005] THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 413
Security authorities ready and permitted to torture one suspect
would need good excuse as to why they did not torture another
when a bomb actually did go off or some other outrage actually
occurred. Thus, may the possibly permissible in extreme cir-
cumstances easily become an obligatory part of the interrogation
procedures in nearly all cases. The door back to medievalism
and barbarism opens all too readily.
In considering this matter the President of the Supreme
Court of Israel rendering the Court's decision of September
1999 that physical interrogation techniques were unlawful even
in ticking bomb situations noted:
We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with the
harsh reality. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all
means are acceptable to it and not all practices are open to it.
Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied
behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserv-
ing the rule of law and recognition of an individual's liberty
constitutes an important component in its understanding of
security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and
allow it to overcome its difficulties.170
In the same vein, Judge Anand, now Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court of India, when confronted with the deaths and tor-
ture of alleged terrorists in police custody, had this to say:
(The) challenge of terrorism must be met with innovative
ideas and approach. State terrorism is no answer to combat
terrorism. State terrorism would only provide legitimacy to
'terrorism'. That would be bad for the State, the community
and above all for the rule of law. The State must, therefore,
ensure that various agencies deployed by it for combating ter-
rorism act within the bounds of law and not become law unto
themselves. 1 7 1
D. Article 5 - Right to Liberty and Security
Article 5 of the Convention reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the follow-
ing cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
170. See id.
171. Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, [1997] 1 S.C.C. 216.
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a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a
competent court;
b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-
compliance with the lawful order of a court or in or-
der to secure the fulfilment of any obligation pre-
scribed by law;
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for
the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably consid-
ered necessary to prevent his committing an offence
or fleeing after having done so;
d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the pur-
pose of educational supervision or his lawful deten-
tion for the purpose of bringing him before the com-
petent legal authority;
e. the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of
the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of un-
sound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent
his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country
or of a person against whom action is being taken
with a view to deportation or extradition;
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a
language which he understands, of the reasons for his ar-
rest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1.c of this article shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Re-
lease may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for
trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or deten-
tion shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a
court and his release ordered if the detention is not law-
ful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention
in contravention of the provisions of this article shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.1 72
This Article provides for the right to liberty and security of per-
172. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 5.
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son. It precludes deprivation of liberty save for: serving a sen-
tence;' 73 where a person is in violation of a Court order;174 arrest
or detention in the course of legal proceedings to bring before
the legal authorities or pending trial where it is feared he might
flee or commit another offense; 75 and other exceptions not di-
rectly relevant here. 1
76
A government must promptly bring a person so detained
under Article 5(1) (c) before a judicial body. 177 This remains a
vital ingredient in the protection against ill-treatment of prison-
ers. There should never be the possibility that the battered and
bloodied body of the mistreated may be hidden away from judi-
cial scrutiny. They must further be able to take proceedings by
which the lawfulness of their detention shall be decided speedily
by a Court.
The case law of the Court recognizes the difficulty of the
States in fighting terrorism as can be seen here. 78 Nonetheless,
the right to liberty remains so central to the personal rights of
the individual, the danger of violation of those rights during
forms of unsupervised detention so great, it does not allow "free
rein" to the States. Subject to the derogation provisions of Arti-
cle 15, the case law shows that the exceptions set out in Para-
graph 1 of Article 5 are exhaustive and to be interpreted nar-
rowly. The Court has referred to "the text of Article 5 § 1 which
sets out an exhaustive list... for a narrow interpretation ....
In lascu & Others v. Moldova & Russia, the Court examined
the alleged violation of Article 5.18° Between June 2, 1992, and
June 4, 1992, the applicants had been arrested at their homes in
Tiraspol by a number of people, some of whom were wearing
uniforms bearing the insignia of the former USSR's Fourteenth
Army. 18' The government accused the applicants of anti-Soviet
173. See id. art. 5(1)(a).
174. See id. art. 5(1)(b).
175. See id. art. 5(1)(c).
176. See id. art. 5(1)(d)-(f).
177. See id. art. 5(3); see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, [1980] Eur. H.R. Rep. 25.
178. See id. 212.
179. Winterwerp v. Netherlands, [1979] Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4, 37, [1980] 2
Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 37.
180. App. No. 48787/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2004) (not yet reported), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=6&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=ilascu&sessionid=1319768&skin=hudoc-en.
181. See id.
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activities and illegally combating the legitimate government of
the State of Transdniestria, under the direction of the Moldovan
Popular Front and Romania.1 2 The government also charged
the petitioners with a number of offenses, which included two
murders.18 3 On December 9, 1993, the "Supreme Court of the
MRT" sentenced Mr. Ilascu to death and ordered the confisca-
tion of his property.1 8 4 The same court sentenced the other ap-
plicants to terms of twelve to fifteen years' imprisonment, and
ordered the confiscation of their property. 85 It inquired as to
whether the government detained the applicants "lawfully," "in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law," and "after con-
viction by a competent court."'8 6 It questioned whether the
"court" which had convicted the applicants met the require-
ments of impartiality and independence, whether it was estab-
lished by law, and whether it guaranteed ajudicial procedure.1 8 7
The Court noted that the requirement of lawfulness in Arti-
cle 5, Section 1 (a) is not satisfied by compliance with the rele-
vant domestic law; compliance must be with convention princi-
ples, particularly the rule of law.188 This embodies the notion of
fair and proper procedure, which should not be arbitrary.1 8 9 In
this regard, a "conviction" cannot result from a flagrant denial of
justice. 9 ° The "Supreme Court of the MRT," which had passed
sentence on Mr. Ilascu, failed all of these tests.19' The MRT was
the breakaway province of Moldova. The Court had therefore
been established by an entity illegal in international law and un-
recognised by the international community. That "court" be-
longed to a system which could hardly function on a constitu-
tional and legal basis reflecting a judicial tradition compatible
with the Convention.9 2 The arbitrary nature of the circum-
stances in which it tried and convicted applicants, as they had
described them in an account which other parties (and as de-
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Winterwerp v. Netherlands, [1979] Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 4, 37.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
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scribed and analyzed by the institutions of the OSCE) did not
dispute evidenced this. 9 ' The Court found that the applicants
had not been convicted by a "court," and that the sentence
passed could not be regarded as "lawful detention" ordered "in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.'
94
E. Article 6 - Right to a Fair Trial
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and
public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the
interests of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests ofjuveniles or the
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or
to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court
in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be pre-
sumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the follow-
ing minimum rights:
a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he un-
derstands and in detail, of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the prepara-
tion of his defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assis-
tance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
when the interests of justice so require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him
and to obtain the attendance and examination of wit-
nesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him;
e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he can-
not understand or speak the language used in
court. 1
95
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 6.
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This Article provides for the right to a fair trial, and, inter
alia, for a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.19 6 Judg-
ments should be pronounced publicly, but the press and public
may be excluded from all or part of the trial where the interests
of national security in a democratic society require it.197
The Article provides that every one charged with a criminal
offense shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty accord-
ing to law.198 At the heart of Article 6 - and indeed in its very
heading as inserted by Protocol No. 11 - is the concept of fair-
ness.' 99 The Court approaches the Article on the principle that
the overall fairness of the trial must be looked at based on its
entirety, rather than based on the specific details.2"'
In the course of battling terrorism, States have created spe-
cial courts in order to deal with the problems brought about by
terrorism.201 The two main common law systems of the Council
of Europe, i.e., the British and the Irish, have developed special
non-jury courts for the trials of specified offenses. 20 2 The Con-
vention does not provide for a right to a trial byjury.2 °3 Many of
the forty-six Council of Europe countries do not provide for the
right to a trial by jury as we understand them in the common law
world, so non-jury courts are not per se in violation of Article 6.204
However, in the case law of the Court, such special courts, like
all courts, must be independent and impartial in the sense of
Article 6.205 In the case of Incal v. Turkey,20 6 the Court found
that the national security courts in Turkey failed to satisfy the
standard of independent and objective impartiality required due
to the presence of a military legal officer on the Court. The
Turkish government argued that the military experience of such
judges would assist their militarily inexperienced civil counter-
parts in dealing with cases involving armed action directed
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See, e.g., Alex Carlile, We Need New Terror Laws, GUARDIAN, Dec. 21, 2004, at 14.
202. See id.
203. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 6.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. [1998] 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449, 1 65-73.
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against the State. 20 7 The Court, however, took the view that
there was a reasonable suspicion or appearance that such a mili-
tary judge who remained in the army and who depended for his
future career prospects upon his military superiors might not
have the required degree of independence or appearance
thereof.208 A long line of judgements against Turkey followed,
which have condemned such courts.20 9
More recently, in the case of Gencel v. Turkey, the Court
(Third Section), in dealing with the consequences of a violation
under Article 6 in relation to State security courts, took the view
that it was necessary to include a statement to the effect that the
most appropriate form of relief would be to retry the appli-
cant.2 10 The Court took the view that this recommendation
should be strictly limited to violations of Article 6, particularly in
relation to the lack of a fair hearing by an independent and im-
partial tribunal on account of the presence of a military judge on
the bench of the State's security court.2 " The Court takes the
view that such a court, failing to fulfil the competency require-
ment due to its lack of independence and impartiality, cannot
provide the authority for a lawful prison sentence.212 The Court
considered that this coincided with a general trend among Con-
vention States to provide for some sort of reopening of proceed-
ings following a judgment of the Court in a case involving an
Article 6 violation.2 1 3 As a result, it added the following para-
graph in some fifty cases involving violations relating to State se-
curity courts in Turkey:
When the Court finds that an applicant has been convicted by
a tribunal which is not independent and impartial within the
meaning of Article 6, paragraph 1, it considers that, in princi-
ple, the most appropriate form of relief would be to ensure
that the applicant is granted in due course a retrial by an in-
dependent and impartial tribunal.214
The Court has also considered the right to remain silent
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. [2003] 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 536.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
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under Article 6.215 It has decided that, although not specifically
mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, this right, and the
right not to incriminate one's self, are generally recognised in-
ternational standards at the heart of the notion of a fair proce-
dure under Article 6.216 These rights are closely linked to the
presumption of innocence contained in Article 6(2) of the Euro-
pean Convention. 217 The Court has upheld these rights in the
case of Heaney & McGuinness v. Ireland.218 In Heany, the govern-
ment arrested the appellants on suspicion of a series of terrorist
offenses. 219 Under Section 52 of the offenses against the State
Act 1939, brought into effect in 1972 by proclamation following
certain terrorist incidents, the government required the appel-
lants to give an account of their movements, convicted and sen-
tenced them for failing to answer.2 20 The Court held, based on
Paragraph 58, that the security and public order concerns relied
on by the government could not justify a provision which extin-
guished the very essence of the right to remain silent and the
right against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the
European Convention. 221 Because of the close link, in this con-
text, between those rights and the presumption of innocence
guaranteed explicitly by Article 6(2), the Court also concluded
the government violated that provision. 222
F. Article 7 - No Punishment Without Law
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under national or international law at
the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier pen-
alty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the
time the criminal offence was committed.
2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time
when it was committed, was criminal according to the
general principles of law recognised by civilised na-
215. See id.
216. See Saunders v. United Kingdom, [1997] 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, 59.
217. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 6.
218. [2001] 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12, 40.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
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tions.223
This Article protects against retrospective criminalization.
In the case of Ecer & Zeyrek v. Turkey,224 the government charged
the applicants with aiding and sheltering alleged terrorists. The
Court was satisfied that these offenses had been committed in
1988 and 1989.2 25 The applicants were sentenced pursuant to
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991 which imposed a 50%
tariff on punishment for offenses in connection with terror-
ism. 226 As a result, they were given a higher sentence than that
provided by law at the time of the commission of the offenses.227
Given this, the Court therefore found a violation of Article 7.228
The Court held:
the guarantee enshrined in Article 7, which is an essential ele-
ment of the rule of law, occupies a prominent place in the
convention system of protection, as is underlined by the fact
that no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 in
time of war or other public emergency. It should be con-
strued and applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in
such a way as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary
prosecution, conviction and punishment.229
G. Article 8 - Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and fam-
ily life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
23 0
223. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 7.
224. [2002] 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, 13.
225. See id. 15.
226. See id.
227. See id. 36.
228. See id. 37.
229. See id. 29.
230. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 8.
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As noted above in Klass v. Germany, 31 interference with the
right to respect for private and family life is permissible only
when such interference is: in accordance with law, necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.23 2 Al-
though the requirements for provision by law and the legitimate
aims have not normally given rise to problems in regard to at-
tempts to deal with terrorism, the requirement that the infringe-
ment be "necessary" has frequently given rise to such difficulties.
In Silver v. United Kingdom, the Court set out a classic exposition
of the principles of the "necessary" requirement:
a) Necessary is not synonymous with "indispensable" nor
has it the flexibility of such expressions as "admissible",
"ordinary", "useful", "reasonable" or "desirable".
b) The contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited
margin of appreciation in the matter of the imposition of
restrictions, but it is for the Court to give the final ruling
on whether they are compatible with the Convention.
c) The phrase "necessary in a democratic society" means
that, to be compatible with the Convention, the interfer-
ence must, inter alia, correspond to a "pressing social
need" and be "proportionate to the limited aim pursued.
d) Those paragraphs of Articles of the Convention which
provide for an exception to a right guaranteed are to be
narrowly interpreted.233
In order to measure whether an action is "proportionate to
the limited aim pursued," the Court has evolved a proportional-
ity test which is applied widely throughout European Conven-
tion articles. 234 This test requires a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised. 23 5 The demands of the general interest of
the community and the requirements of the protection of the
231. [1978] 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, [1979-1980] 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214.
232. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established
Thereby, May 11, 1994, Eur. T.S. No. 155, art. 8(2).
233. Silver v. United Kingdom, [1981] 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 475, 97.
234. James v. United Kingdom, [1986] 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 50.
235. See id. 50.
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individual's fundamental rights must strike a fair balance.23 6
Thus, any interference with such a right must minimize the pos-
sible inconsistencies with the achievement of the legitimate goal
sought and it is for the Court to determine if that balance has
been achieved.2 3 7
H. Article 10 - Freedom of Expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licens-
ing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it du-
ties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formali-
ties, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or pubic
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclo-
sure of information received in confidence, or for main-
taining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.23 8
As stated by the Court, this Article "constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the ba-
sic conditions for its progress and for each individual's self-fulfil-
ment."23 ' Restrictions to such freedom of expression are permis-
sible, however, under the second paragraph of the Article which
allows such restrictions where required by national security, ter-
ritorial integrity or public safety or for the prevention of disor-
der or crime. 4 ° In the struggle against terrorism and the devel-
opment of the European Convention jurisprudence, two issues
that have arisen related to Article 10 include: (a) "hate speech"
and speech inciting violence and (b) broadcasting.
The Court addressed the issue of "hate speech" in Surek v.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 10.
239. Thoma v. Luxembourg, [2003] 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21, 43.
240. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby,
May 11, 1994, Eur. T.S. No. 155, art. 10(2).
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Turkey.241 This case arose from the publication of two letters in a
weekly review that accused the State of brutalities, massacres and
murders in "Kurdistan. ' ' 24 2 The applicant, a major shareholder,
was fined and convicted of disseminating propaganda against
the "indivisibility" of the State.243 The Court held that the Euro-
pean Convention allowed such a restriction of the freedom of
speech under Article 10(2) because it had involved an interfer-
ence with the right to freedom of expression,2 4 4 it was prescribed
by law "45 and had a legitimate purpose. 24 6 The final question,
however, remained whether such a restriction was a necessary
measure. 2 47 The Court addressed the issue by noting that the
exceptions provided in Article 10 must be strictly interpreted.248
A margin of appreciation is allowed but goes hand in hand with
a European supervision that embraces notjust the national legis-
lation but the decision of national courts applying it. 2 4 9 The
Court also noted the responsibility of the media not to overstep
the bounds set to protect the State against threats of violence
and of national security.250 It recognized, however, that the
press must also impart information and ideas on political issues
including divisive ones. 2 5' Not only does the press have the duty
to impart such information and ideas, the public has a right to
receive them.252 The Court found that the letters in this case
were likely to stir up hatred and violence 253 and, in a split vote of
eleven votes to six, ruled that the State had not overstepped the
mark and therefore there was no. violation.254
The Court addressed the issue of restrictions on broadcast-
ing in Purcell v. Ireland where the former Commission of Human
Rights upheld a broadcasting ban on Republican parties both in
Ireland and Northern Ireland on the basis that it was propor-
241. [1999] 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 339.
242. See id. 7 10.
243. See id. 77 9, 14.
244. See id. 43.
245. See id. 48.
246. See id. 1 52.
247. See id. It 53-65.
248. See id. 58(i).
249. See id. I 58(ii).
250. See id. 1 59.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id. 62.
254. See id.
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tionate to the need to protect national security and prevent dis-
order and crime in the context of battling against terrorism.255
As the Court had done on several occasions, the Commission
emphasised that freedom of expression constituted one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society.25 6 The exercise of
that freedom "carries with it duties and responsibilities" and that
the defeat of terrorism remains a public interest of the first im-
portance in a democratic society. 25 7 In a situation where politi-
cally motivated violence poses a constant threat to the lives and
security of the population and where the advocates of this vio-
lence seek access to the mass media for publicity purposes, it is
particularly difficult to strike a fair balance between the require-
ments of protecting freedom of information and the imperatives
of protecting the State and the public against armed conspira-
cies seeking to overthrow the democratic order which guaran-
tees this freedom and other human rights. 258 The Irish Govern-
ment subsequently lifted the ban.2 5 9
I. First Protocol: Article 1 - The Right to Property
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoy-
ment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his pos-
sessions except in the public interest and subject to the condi-
tions provided for by law and by the general principles of in-
ternational law. 2 6
0
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general inter-
est or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.
261
This Article protects the right to the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions, subject to the public interest and as provided by law
and by the general principles of international law.262 One of the
possible ways by which the States may fight terrorism seems to
255. App. No. 15404/89, [1991] 70 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 262, in 1991
Y.B. EUR. CoNv. H.R. 90, 99 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1991).
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See European Convention, supra note 12, art. I (as amended by Protocol 1).
261. Id.
262. See id.
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have been signalled by the Court in Phillips v. United Kingdom.263
The Court in this case considered the provisions of the British
Drug Trafficking Act of 1994, which provided for a confiscation
order in respect of assets following conviction of drugs of-
fenses.2 64 It held that the government could confiscate the prop-
erty in question where it was deemed to be the proceeds of drug
trafficking.265 This created a presumption that any property, ap-
pearing to have been held by the defendant at any time since his
conviction or during the period of six years before the date of
commencement of the criminal proceedings, had been received
as a payment or reward in connection with drug trafficking and
any expenditure incurred by him during the same period were
paid for out of the proceeds of drug trafficking.266 This pre-
sumption was rebuttable. 267 The sum payable corresponded to
the amount, which the trial judge found the applicant to have
benefited from through drug trafficking over the preceding six
years and which he was able to realize from assets within his pos-
session for which he had been unable to produce an explanation
sufficient to overturn the statutory presumption. 268 The burden
of proof lay upon the convict and was to the balance of
probabilities.269
The Court considered that this did amount to an "interfer-
ence" with the right of peaceful possession of property under
Article 1 of Protocol 11.270 The Court further held that the stat-
utory provision "must be construed in the light of the general
principle set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph and
there must, therefore, exist a reasonable relationship of propor-
tionality between the means employed and the aim sought."271
The aim pursued by the confiscation order procedure conferred
upon the courts a further "weapon in the fight against the
scourge of drug trafficking." '272 It would act as a deterrent to
263. [2001] Eur. H.R. Rep. 433.
264. See Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, c. 37, §§ 2, 4 (Eng.) (superseding the Drug
Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986).
265. See Phillips, [2001] Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, 52-54.
266. See id. 1 33, 41.
267. See id. 1 43.
268. See id. 1 44.
269. See id. 33, 43.
270. See id. 1 50.
271. See id. 51.
272. See id. 52.
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those hoping to make large profits.2 73 It would also act to de-
prive a person of profits actually made and would also remove
the value of such proceeds from future investment in the drugs
trade.274 The Court found the procedure fair.275 In Paragraph
54, the Court held that "[a] gainst this background and given the
importance of the aim pursued," the interference suffered by
the applicant was not disproportionate and therefore there was
no violation.276
The Court's based its reasoning upon the importance of
277Intibattling the drugs trade with every available weapon. In this
case, the weapon was a financial one of seizing financial assets.
It is not difficult to imagine that similar provisions made in the
struggle against terrorism would meet the same approach by the
Court, subject to the same levels of fairness in the procedures.
J. Article 15 - Derogation in Time of Emergency
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take
measures derogating from its obligations under this Con-
vention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation, provided that such measures are not incon-
sistent with its other obligations under international
law.
2 7 8
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths
resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (par-
agraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. 279
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of
derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has
taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the
Convention are again being fully executed. 2 1
In cases that arose out of the fight against terrorism in Eu-
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. 53.
276. See id. 54.
277. See id. 52.
278. European Convention, supra note 12, art. 15(1).
279. See id. art. 15(2).
280. See id. art. 15(3).
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rope, the Court has examined convention provisions allowing
derogation from these and other derogable rights. Article 15
specifically provides derogation "in time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation. 28'
This derogation provision was considered in the very first
case the Court ever dealt with which was then called the "Law-
less" case.28 2 It is now more normally referred to as Lawless v.
Ireland. It is interesting to read the case, as it shows a new inter-
national court deciding on various aspects of its procedures for
the first time in a case before it. The petitioner, Lawless, com-
plained that he was detained without trial in contravention of
Articles 5, 6, and 7.288 In an effort to deal with IRA activities in
the border areas between Northern Ireland and Ireland, the
Irish Government had introduced detention without trial in
1957.284 The Government, also by letter to the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Council of Europe, notified its intention to do so. 28 5
The Court proceeded to consider the power of derogation
under Article 15 at Paragraph 22 of the judgement of the July 1,
1961.286 It held that the Court determines whether the condi-
tions laid down in Article 15 had been fulfilled. 7 It then went
on to examine the existence of "a public emergency threatening
the life of the [N] ation" and as to whether the measures taken in
derogation from obligations under the European Convention
"strictly required [] the exigencies of the situation. '288 The
Court requires these for a valid derogation.28 9
The Court proceeded to a minute examination of each as-
pect of these criteria.290 It also examined whether the notifica-
tion procedure had been correct and whether the derogating
measures were "inconsistent with ...other obligations under
international law."29 1 In Paragraph 28, the Court noted that
"the emergency" referred to meant "an exceptional situation of
281. See id. art. 15(1).
282. See Lawless v. Ireland, [1960] 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 1.
283. See id. 15.
284. See id. 1 18, 31.
285. See id. 1 19, 31.
286. See id. 30.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. 1 31-34.
291. See id. 30, 36-37.
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crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and con-
stitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which
the State is composed."29 2 In the same paragraph, the Court
noted that the combination of factors that reasonably led the
Government to deduce such an emergency: 1) the existence in
the country's territory of a secret army using violence to attain its
ends; 2) the fact that this secret army was operating outside the
State thereby seriously jeopardising Ireland's relations with its
neighbour; and 3) the steady and alarming increase in terrorist
activities from the Autumn of 1956 and throughout the first half
of 1957.293 The Court upheld the Irish Government's deroga-
tion.
The Court in its jurisprudence acknowledges a wide margin
of appreciation to the States in determining the existence of an
emergency and the exigency of the measures taken. Nonethe-
less, it is not carte blanche. The Court will examine every aspect of
the provisions of Article 15 in a case where the government re-
lies upon its derogation under that Article. The Lawless case
demonstrates the searching investigation that the Court under-
takes to determine if the derogation remains valid.
In the subsequent case of Brannigan & McBride v. United
Kingdom, the Court further considered its approach in relation
to derogation under Article 15 and actions taken thereunder.294
The Court found that while the question of whether an emer-
gency threatened the life of the nation and what measures re-
quired dealing with it was better left with the State in question,
the State did not enjoy an unlimited margin of appreciation.29
It is for the Court to rule on whether, inter alia, the States
have gone beyond the "extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the crisis."296 The domestic margin of appreciation is thus
accompanied by a European supervision.297 At the same time, in
exercising its supervision, the Court must give appropriate
weight to such relevant factors as the nature of the rights af-
fected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to the dero-
292. See id. 31.
293. See id. 31-32.
294. [1994] 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539.
295. See id. at Opinion, 44.
296. See id.
297. See id.
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gation, and the duration of the emergency situation. 9
A more recent exposition of the Court's view on this matter,
which reflects the intervening case law, is to be found in Aksoy v.
Turkey:
The Court recalls that it falls to each contracting State, with
its responsibility for "the life of [its] nation" to determine
whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and,
if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome
the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous con-
tact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national au-
thorities are in principle better placed than the international
judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency
and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to
avert it. Accordingly, in this matter, a wide margin of appreci-
ation should be left to the national authorities.
Nonetheless, contracting parties do not enjoy an unlim-
ited discretion. It is for the Court to rule whether, inter alia,
the States have gone beyond the "extent strictly required by
the exigencies" of the crisis. The domestic margin of appreci-
ation is thus accompanied by a European supervision. In ex-
ercising this supervision, the Court must give appropriate
weight to such relevant factors as the nature of the rights af-
fected by the derogation and the circumstances leading to,
and the duration of, the emergency situation.
29 9
CONCLUSION
The above examples demonstrate the way in which the Eu-
ropean Convention has developed its jurisprudence to meet the
requirements of the battle against terrorism. The Court has
clearly expressed the view that it remains the duty of govern-
ments to fight terrorism because it is fundamentally an attack on
democracy and the rule of law, the very pillars on which rest the
human rights protective system. As the case law shows, the Court
has dealt with terrorism problems that have arisen since 1956.
This near half-century of experience may, therefore, assist those
who have had more recent experience of terrorism. States must
have the ability to protect themselves effectively against terror-
ism, and human rights law must accommodate this need.
The European Convention must be applied in such a way as
298. See id. at Judgment, 1 43.
299. Aksoy v. Turkey, [1997] 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 68.
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to allow States to take reasonable and proportionate action to
defend democracy and the rule of law. The European Conven-
tion is not, to coin a phrase, "a mutual suicide pact." The role of
the European Court of Human Rights in this regard strikes the
correct balance between the necessity to take all appropriate
protective measures and the duty of all to avoid subverting the
rights and freedoms which lie at the heart of and are the "sine
qua non" of democracy. In the cases cited above, which involve
Article 1 and the requirement on governments to secure the
rights contained in the Convention, Article 2 and the duty to
safeguard life where resorting to force, Article 3 and the con-
demnation of torture and inhuman treatment, Article 5 and the
right to liberty, Article 6 and the right to a fair trial, Article 7 and
the guarantee of no punishment without law, Article 8 and State
surveillance of its citizens, Article 10 and freedom of expression,
Article 1 of Protocol Number One and the confiscation of assets,
and finally Article 15 and the Court's supervision of the power of
derogation, the Court has shown that it remains possible to fight
terrorism with success while at the same time protecting those
rights which characterize our countries as democracies. It is
more than possible; for almost fifty years governments have done
